The panel affirmed the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254
habeas corpus petition challenging a conviction and capital
sentence for murder.
The panel affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s
change of venue motion, including petitioner’s contention
that there is a heightened obligation to change venue in
capital cases, because the state court’s decision—that the
substantial media coverage of this “sensational, small-town
murder” was not constitutionally prejudicial—was not
contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent.
The panel affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s
claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), because
the state court’s decision that the prosecutor’s race-neutral
explanations for exercising peremptory challenges against
two Hispanic potential jurors was not contrary or an
unreasonable application of Batson.
The panel also affirmed the denial of relief as to
petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process based on a
belated request for access to the sanitized crime scene.
The panel affirmed the denial of relief as to petitioner’s
request for jury instructions on voluntary intoxication instruction and second degree murder, for lack of supportingevidence, because the state court’s decision was consistent
with Supreme Court precedent.
The panel held that the state court’s rejection of
petitioner’s claim that the trial court erroneously applied a
causal nexus test to evidence that petitioner’s dysfunctional
childhood could not be considered as an independent
mitigating factor was not contrary to or an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent. The panel explained
that the record reflects that the sentencing court
“meticulously” weighed the mitigating and aggravating
factors and employed the causal nexus test as a permissible
means of weighing the entirety of the mitigating evidence
prior to imposing sentence, and any error did not prejudice
petitioner.
Finally, the panel held that the state court’s denial of
relief on petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and did not
warrant a remand under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309
(2012). Petitioner claimed that he was denied his right to
counsel due to an irreconcilable conflict, and that counsel was
ineffective by sleeping during the trial and by failing to
interview a critical witness who would have supported the
defense theory that petitioner happened to be in the area
where the murders were committed but did not commit them.
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